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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1991).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Is it error for the trial court to admit fatally

prejudicial testimony based on an unreliable hearsay statement?
Questions as to the admissibility of evidence are governed by the
abuse of discretion standard.

Pearce v* Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489

(Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The

following

constitutional

provisions

and

rules

are

determinative:
1.

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment;

2.

Utah State Constitution, Article I, § 6 ;

3.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 601 (c) and 803 (4).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff and appellant Gail 0. Hansen ("Ms. Hansen") brought
this action in the Third Judicial District Court to recover
compensation

for

injuries

she

sustained

as

a

result

of

an

automobile collision. Ms. Hansen's vehicle was struck from behind
by a vehicle driven by James Woo ("Woo"), who died during the
pendency of this action of causes unrelated to the collision.
at 3, 12, 97-99. )
1

(R.

Woo, through his personal representative, John. Heath, made a
motion

for

summary

judgment

on

the

basis

that

his

alleged

unexpected blackout relieved him of any negligence. (R. at 44-96).
This motion was denied.

(R. at 131).

Ms. Hansen made a motion for an order to strike certain
hearsay statements relating to defendant's alleged blackout.
at 100-114).

This motion was also denied.

(R.

(R. at 131).

Ms. Hansen made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of
Dr. Roger Freedman, as any opinion Dr. Freedman might have relating
to Woo's alleged black-out arose from the defendant's impermissible
hearsay that he had suffered a black-out. (R. at 346-353). Later,
this same motion was made at trial. (R. at 556-557) Ms. Hansen's
motions to exclude the medical record references to an alleged
black-out and to exclude the testimony of Dr. Freedman regarding
the alleged black-out were denied.

(R. at 423, 559). Woo then

made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied.

(R. at

422).

Statement of Facts
1.

On or about July 15, 1988 Plaintiff Hansen was severely

injured when the vehicle she was driving was struck by a vehicle
driven by Defendant Woo.
2.

(R. 3)

At the scene of the collision, Woo did not offer any

explanation

for his erratic driving, which included

swerving

sharply to the left and then quickly correcting back hard to the
right before crashing into Ms. Hansen's vehicle. Additionally, Woo
2

never mentioned any black-out to witnesses at the scene or to the
paramedics who treated and questioned him in great detail about his
medical conditions or problems immediately following the collision.
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 11, a true copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "A")
3.

Nearly one hour later, at the hospital, Woo is reported

to have stated

that he believed

he had

"lost conciousness"

momentarily, which statement was equated with a "syncope" or
"syncopal episode" in the medical profession.

(Defendant's Trial

Exhibit Number 12, a true copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B")
4.

Ms. Hansen brought the subject personal injury action

against Woo, who died during the pendency of the action of causes
unrelated to the collision.

(R. 2-8, 97-99)

John Heath, in his

capacity as personal representative of the estate of James Woo, was
substituted as defendant.
5.

(R. 210-216, 224-225)

Woo offered his alleged syncopal episode as a defense,

claiming it relieved him of all liability since the purported
syncope was allegedly unforeseeable and allegedly caused him to
lose control over his vehicle.
6.

(R. 44-96)

The evidence offered at trial in support of Woo's claim

all stemmed from his self-serving hearsay statement made long after
the collision, which possibly was innacurately understood or
reported in the medical records.

By the time Woo first mentions

"losing conciousness," sufficient time had passed for him to
reflect and consider the statement in the context of the crash.
(See Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 12, Exhibit
3

f, ff

B )

7.

In pre-trial motions and at trial, including a motion to

strike the hearsay statements, plaintiff objected to the use of any
evidence

which

derived

from

this

inadmissible hearsay evidence.

extremely

prejudicial

and

(R. 100-114, 336-353, 485-488.)

Said motions were denied, and the judge admitted the evidence of
alleged syncope as a "presumed" diagnosis in the nodical records,
along with the testimony of Dr. Freedman based upon the records.
Dr. Freedman had never treated nor examined Woo, but only reviewed
the medical records, including Woo's hearsay statement, and later
was allowed to testify to the probability of the alleged syncopal
episode and its causes and foreseeability. (R. 505, 530-548)
8.

The trial court noted that Rule 803 (4) of the Utah Rules

of Evidence seemed to offer support for allowing the hearsay
statement into evidence. (R. 559.) Rule 601 (c) was also discussed
in arguments for and against the admission of the evidence, and may
have figured in the trial court's decision to admit the hearsay.
(R. 479, 492-493)
9.

At

trial, the

jury

accepted

the

testimony

of Dr.

Freedman, although based on speculations derived from hearsay,
believing
negligent.

Woo

blacked-out,

and

determined

that

he

was

not

(R.463-464)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/appellant Gail 0. Hansen respectfully requests this
court to reverse the judgment entered against her and remand her
claim for a new trial, because the trial court erred in admitting
4

impermissible
collision.

hearsay

evidence

addressing

the

cause

of

the

Speculative medical testimony based upon this hearsay

was then allowed to be entered against plaintiff in violation of
her constitutional right to cross-examine all witnesses against
her.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
INADMISSABLE HEARSAY USED AGAINST PLAINTIFF:

The hearsay

statement reportedly made by the defendant, that he had suffered a
momentary black-out, was first made long after the collision, so as
to

raise

Defendant's

grave

suspicions

ambiguous

of

statement,

fabrication
as reported

or
in

misstatement.
the medical

records, is impermissible hearsay because it was not within any
exception to the hearsay rule and thus the trial court should have
excluded it. If this hearsay statement, and all speculation based
upon it, were properly excluded, then likewise, the medical
testimony of Dr. Freedman about the alleged blackout necessarily
would have been excluded.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A VERDICT MAY BE SET ASIDE IF IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
"HAD A SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE VERDICT"
This Court has stated that "the fact alone that evidence was
erroneously admitted [is not] sufficient to set aside a verdict
unless it has 'had a substantial influence in bringing about the
verdict.'" Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). The
5

logical corollary of this statement is that where* the evidence
improperly admitted did have a "substantial influence in bringing
about the verdict", the erroneous admission should be adequate
grounds to set aside the verdict•
In the instant case, the error manifest in the admission of
Defendant Woo's self-serving exculpatory hearsay statement at the
hospital a long time after the collision most decidesdly did have a
"substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."

If the

court had excluded the challenged evidence, defendant's liability
was without question.
The trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence
permitted a great deal of medical speculation about: Woo's alleged
syncopal episode. Most damaging was the testimony of Dr. Freedman
regarding the alleged black-out.

Had all evidence derived from

Woo's self-serving hearsay statement properly been excluded, the
outcome of the trial would definitely have been in Ms. Hansen's
favor.

POINT II.
WOO'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ALLEGED "BLACK-OUT"
WAS HEARSAY NOT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION
Following the collision, Defendant Woo made a statement
that he "suddenly lost consciousness."

(See Exhibit "B".)

This statement was first made after an ambulance had taken him to
the hospital.

Sufficient time had elapsed before Woo first

mentioned blacking-out to raise suspicions of fabrication.

From

this statement, a great deal of speculation about the medical

6

records and in the testimony of Dr. Freedman

followed, all

suggesting that Woo may have suffered a syncopal episode.

This

medical speculation was before the jury, and clearly influenced the
jury, as they found Woo was not negligent.
This statement was inadmissible hearsay and the trial court
properly should have excluded it.

Exclusion would result in

precluding Dr. Freedman1s testimony as well. Plaintiff was denied
the right to a fair trial by the trial court's error in admitting
the testimony.

A. Due Process Requires Adequate Opportunity to Cross-Examine
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the Utah State Constitution, Article I, § 6 both require that a
litigant be afforded due process. An integral part of due process
is the right to cross-examine witnesses to explore the basis and
credibility of their statements.

The California Court of Appeals

has stated that to "deny a litigant the right to cross-examine a
witness who testifies against him is a denial of due process of
law."
(1967).

[Citations omitted.]

Long v. Long, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790, 792

In the present case, plaintiff was denied her right to

cross-exam Defendant Woo on the basis and credibility of his
statement, and on certain critical details of his statement, such
as when the alleged "black-out" actually occurred.

For example,

did the "black-out" occur before the collision, as the trial court
seemed to assume, because of the collision, or after the collision?
How long did the "black-out" last?

7

Did the defendant have any

warning of the impending "black-out"? Assuming he did "black-out,"
did he regain consciousness in sufficient
collision?
other

time to avoid the

Plaintiff's right to cross-examination on these and

numerous

details

about

the

statement

which

may

have

drastically altered its effect at trial was precluded by the
court's ruling allowing the hearsay into evidence.
The statement made by Woo, as recorded by the individual
writing in his medical chart, is so completely ambiguous and
uncertain that to allow it to come in, at face value and with no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, is a clear denial of
justice to the innocent plaintiff who is severely injured, and is
then denied recovery because of the statement. There are manifest
possibilities left unexplored in the bare statement that Woo "lost
conciousness suddenly", most of which would result in liability to
Woo, and recovery to Ms. Hansen.
If Woo had in fact fallen asleep briefly, he would still be
liable to Ms. Hansen. If he had "blacked-out" momentarily a minute
before the collision, but had regained conciousness in sufficient
time to control his car and avoid the collision, he would still be
liable.

If the "black-out" had happened as a result of the

collision, or in the moment just after the collision, he would
still have been liable. If Woo had felt the impending "black-out",
but had ignored the warning, he would still be liable to Ms. Hansen
for her injuries.
There are ample explanations for the ambiguous statement
reported in the medical record which would still make Woo liable to

8

Ms. Hansen for the injuries she suffered in the collision. None of
these

explanations

could be explored,

because Woo had died.

Consequently, the statement came in, unchallenged and untested, and
completely foreclosed Ms. Hansen's right to recover.
This result is a travesty of justice, an example of exalting
form over substance.

The trial court, following defendant's

urging, allowed what it construed to be "the rules of evidence" to
triumph over common-sense and a realistic application of truth to
the facts, and in the process allowed an innocent injured party to
be left to suffer without recourse.
One of the most fundamental aspects of our American judicial
system is the adversarial nature of proceedings, allowing litigants
from both sides the opportunity to fully probe any statements
offered against them, to examine the truth of the statements and to
explore the circumstantial parameters of the statements.

Courts

and

cross-

litigants

rely

on

open

confrontation,

incisive

examination, a serious oath, the threat of perjury for any false
statements and the gravity of the situation to encourage a truthful
and full disclosure so that the jury might have the fullest basis
on which to consider the case.
It has been stated that "the hearsay rule exists primarily to
protect

a party's right

(Bergman, Ambiguity;

to cross-examine

adverse

testimony."

The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks

About,75 Kentucky Law Journal 841.
and Wigmore's Evidence].)

9

[Citing McCormick on Evidence

In the absence of adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant —

the person who made the out-of-court statement

—

about the facts surrounding the statement, it is likely that the
statement,

as

admitted

into

evidence,

will

contain

serious

ambiguities and inherent defects which cannot be fully probed, even
by asking questions of the witnesses who convey the hearsay.

In

most cases, and particularly so in this case, the person who
conveys the hearsay to the fact-finder has no further information
about the statement.

As a result, the statement is presented to

the jury full of prejudicial confusion and misrepresentations.
Professor Tribe has elucidated the purposes underlying the
hearsay

rule

and

its

"Testimonial Triangle."
Law Review 957.)

exceptions

in his

theory,

coined

the

(Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harvard

Professor Tribe's thesis is that courts and

attorneys should avoid rigid application of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule and focus instead on the purposes of the rule and
whether the proffered statement circumvents the valid reasons
behind the rule.
The Testimonial Triangle involves an analysis of the mental
process which occurs when a hearsay statement is uttered and
accepted. To accept a statement made by an out of court declarant,
the trier of fact must begin at a point of the triangle, called
Point A, which represents what the declarant said.

Point B

represents the declarant's belief in the truth of what he has said.
The path from Point A to Point B must necessarily pass through
questions as to the declarant's sincerity, as well as any ambiguity
10

inherent in the statement. The third point of the triangle (Point
C) represents the conclusions which follow from the declarant's
statement. From Point B to Point C, one questions the declarant's
memory and perception of the event.

Id. at 959.

At any point

along the triangle, if the trier of fact is unable to effectively
assess

the

declarant,

his

sincerity,

any

ambiguity

in

his

statement, the declarant's memory or lack of it regarding the
statement, and the declarant's perception of the event spoken of,
a hearsay problem arises.
In this case, Woo's statement, first documented
Veterans Administration Medical Certificate

in the

was that "he was

driving out of VA [from an earlier appointment]. On 7th East
involved in multi-car accident.

Patient states he was driving,

suddenly lost consciousness [without] warning." (See Exhibit "B".)
A number of questions arise surrounding the correct understanding
and transmission of the statement.

Woo had a communication

barrier, as English was his second language.

This problem must

certainly have been heightened by his age, ill-health and the
injuries and confusion resulting from the collision.
It is likely the statement he made was that the last thing he
remembers was turning onto 7th East coming from the VA hospital due
to retrograde amnesia which he may have suffered as a result of the
collision. With the communication difficulties, made worse on this
occasion by health problems and stress, the statement written by
the admissions nurse is far from reliable.

11

It is also significant that the Utah EMS Incident Report,
filled out earlier, at the scene of the collision, contains the
ambulance driver's impression, which was not attributed to Woo,
that his "PRE-HOSPITAL IMPRESSION" was "poss. syncope."
Exhibit "A".)

(See

It is very possible the idea for the explanation

subsequently offered by Woo at the hospital originetlly came from
the ambulance driver's suggestion.
It is this type of

ambiguity

about the origin of the

statement, its veracity, its communication to the person who wrote
the report and the details of the statement which the plaintiff
should have had the opportunity to explore on cross-examination.
Exactly when did the alleged black-out occur?

Before, as a result

of, or after the collision? Did Woo actually fall asleep briefly,
or was he distracted by another health problem to which he was
subject, such as violent coughing, excessive

acidity

stomach, shortness of breath or irregular heart beats?

in his

Should he,

in the exercise of reasonable care, have been able to avoid the
collision?

At trial, plaintiff's counsel could not ask any of

these questions, for no one could give a complete answer, since the
only person with full knowledge of the facts behind the statement
was James Woo, who had died.
According to Professor Tribe, the flaws in an out-of-court
statement such as Woo's should be considered, apart from whether it
can be made to fit into one of the established exceptions. In this
way, a more flexible and realistic application of the hearsay rule
may be reached, rather than a mechanistic, rote application of the

12

rule

and

its

exceptions, which

often

results

in confusion,

misapplication and injustice.
To utterly deny plaintiff her recovery because the trial court
interpreted the rule to allow such a statement into evidence, when
the rule doesn't anticipate such serious defects in communication,
recordation and transmission of the statement is to exalt form over
substance and to celebrate inflexible rules over true justice.
This result should not be countenced by this court.
The frequent recitation of an assumed "black-out" in medical
records and even Dr. Freedman's testimony resulted in plaintiff
being greatly prejudiced.

Plaintiff lost her right to cross-

examine the key adverse witness, who gave testimony which, standing
alone, defeated her claim.

Consequently, the admission of this

statement was error which requires reversal of the trial court's
judgment and a remand for a new trial.

B.

Rule 601 (&) Does Not Allow the Admission of Woo's Statement
One of the primary arguments raised by counsel for the defense

in support of

the admissibility

of Woo's statement

and all

derivative statements following it was Rule 601 (c) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

(R. 488)

This exception to the hearsay rule

seems to have figured in the court's determination to allow the
statement into evidence.
Rule 601 (c) (2), however, provides a caveat which precludes
a hearsay statement which might otherwise come in under Rule 601
(c) from being admitted if it "was made under circumstances such as
13

to indicate its lack of trustworthiness." No controlling authority
is found for interpreting a "lack of trustworthiness" on facts
similar to the instant case.
Rule 601 (c) is one of the few instances in the Utah Rules of
Evidence in which the Utah Rules deviate from the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The reason for this deviation, according to the Advisory
Committee Note, was that the "Dead Man" statute in Utah had been
repealed, and some compensation for it was required, which hadn't
been provided in the Federal Rules.

The note states further that

the "two paragraphs [subparagraphs (b) and (c)] have been taken
from Sections 1227 and 1261 of the California Evidence Code."
(Utah Court Rules Annotated, 1992, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule
601, Advisory Committee Note.)
In the absence of some controlling interpretation of Rule 601
(c) from

this jurisdiction, one may take guidance

identical passages in the California Evidence Code.

from the
(See, e.g.

State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1984); State v. Gray, 717
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986).) The Law Revision Comments in Deering
California Code Annotated, Evidence
safeguards —

§ 1261, state that "[c]ertain

i.e., personal knowledge, recent perception, and

circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness -- are included in the
section to provide some protection for the party acfainst whom the
statements are offered, for he has no opportunity to test the
hearsay by cross-examination."

[emphasis added.]

The drafters of the original, identical, provision to that
found in Rule 601 (c) (2) recognized the potential dangers of
14

allowing hearsay statements of a deceased individual to come into
evidence, and provided a safeguard against this in the form of a
provision that the statement is:
inadmissible under this section if the
statement was made under circumstances such as
to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
The "lack of trustworthiness" in the situation surrounding the
making of the statement is the critical consideration.

In a

criminal case involving Rule 804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,

the

court

analyzed

the

"catch

all" or

"residual"

exception which allows hearsay if it has "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" equivalent to the other exceptions of Rule 804.
U.S. v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir, 1978).
point

of

that

case

was

the

Since the focal

"circumstantial

guarantees

of

trustworthiness", which is analogous to the provision of Rule 601
(c) (2) forbidding

the admission of an otherwise

admissible

statement if it "was made under circumstances such as to indicate
its lack of trustworthiness," some guidance may be had from the
Bailey

court's

interpretation

trustworthiness or lack of same.

of

circumstances

indicating

The court stated that:

the trustworthiness of a statement should be
analyzed by evaluating not only the facts
corroborating the veracity of the statement,
but also the circumstances in which the
declarant made the statement and the incentive
he had to speak truthfully or falsely.
Further, consideration should be given to
factors bearing on the reliability of the
reporting of the hearsay by the witness. Id.
at 349. [Emphasis added.]
Woo's statement was made sometime after the collision, and was
made

under

circumstances

which
15

would

"indicate

its

lack of

trustworthiness", or at the very least, its substantial ambiguity,
precluding unquestioned acceptance of the statement as truth. The
fact that the statement was made some substantial time after the
collision, and that the ambulance driver may have suggested the
excuse, and the fact that the Woo has some difficulty with
communication under the best circumstances, even more so under the
stress of a traumatic event and that the statement itself was
ambiguous, in that it contained no clear indication whether it
referred to an alleged "black-out" before, because of, or after the
collision, all bring the "trustworthiness" of Woo's statement into
question.
Because the statement was self-serving, made out of court
under circumstances which make its reliability questionable, and
because it could not be probed on cross-examination, its admission
into evidence was error.

As a result of the statement being

admitted, plaintiff was denied her right to cross-csxamination and
was gravely prejudiced.

Consequently, the judgment of the trial

court should be reversed, and this case remanded for a new trial.
C. The Exception From Rule 803 (4) Offers No Justification
For the Admission of Woo's Hearsay Statement
Another exception to the hearsay rule which the court relied
upon to justify the admission of Woo's statement is the exception
provided by Rule 803 (4), which allows statements made for the
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, "insofar as they are
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" to be admissible.
Once again, little controlling authority exists to elucidate Utah's
16

Rule 803 (4), and none of it is relevant to the current inquiry.
But, as this Court has stated: "[s]ince the advisoury committee
generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's rules and the
federal rules, this Court looks to the interpretations of the
federal rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah
rules."

[Citations omitted.]

State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317

(Utah 1986).
The language of the rule itself is very clear that to admit
the proffered hearsay statement, under Rule 803 (4), the hearsay
must be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."

Federal

courts have almost universally interpreted this to mean that
statements as to the fault or cause of an accident or collision do
not become admissible under this rule merely because they are made
to a physician.

No evidence was offered that Woo's statement that

he believed he had suffered a "black-out" was "reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment."
One court interpreting this provision stated plainly that a
"statement as to how an injury occurred would not qualify under the
'statements of physical condition* exception to the hearsay rule".
Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939 (9th Cir,
1956).

This principle has been more recently and clearly stated,

in U.S. v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp 252 (SD Mich 1977).

In Narciso the

court stated that Rule 803 (4) is:
limited to facts related which are 'reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment; f it has never been held to
apply to accusations of personal fault, either in a civil
or criminal context. Thus, the commentators have said
that fa party's statement that he was struck by an
automobile would qualify but not his statement that the
17

car was driven through a red light.'"
Id. at 289.

[Emphasis added.]

The court in Narciso went on to explain that even where
the doctor's motive was further diagnosis, the underlying
assumption of the rule requires the Court to inquire as
to the declarant's motivation for giving the information.
If his motive is to disclose the information to aid in
his own diagnosis and treatment, this, it is assumed,
guarantees the statement's trustworthiness. However, if
the declarant makes the statement while under the
impression that he is being asked to indicate 'who was
responsible' for what happened, his response may very
well be accusatory in nature and any inherent reliability
of such a statement is thereby destroyed."
[Emphasis
added.] Id.
The case at bar presents a situation which is directly
analogous to the reasoning in Narciso —

the doctor may have used

the hearsay statement in some way for purposes of diagnosis and
treatment, but it is also highly likely, given the circumstances of
the

statement, that the statement was made

for purposes of

indicating "who was responsible" for what happened, such that "any
inherent reliability of such a statement is thereby destroyed." No
inquiry was made by the court as to the reason for the statement.
Beyond the fact that Woo's veracity is open to question, and could
not

be

cross-examined,

the

statement

had

inherent

pivotal

ambiguities, as to the exact time the alleged "black-out" occurred
and the severity and duration of it.
The foundation and purpose of Rule 803 (4) is to admit
statements
treatment.

made

to

physicians

for

the

purpose

of

care

and

Here the statement is not intimately involved with

diagnosis, care or treatment, but rather is taken out of that
specific context and artificially made to travel backward in time
18

to the collision scene to be used as a "liability" defense.

The

spirit and letter of the exception of the hearsay rule is to permit
such statements in the diagnosis, care and treatment context
existing at the time the statement is uttered.

This purpose is

violated when the statement is used for another reason, in an
earlier time, for the purpose of denying liability.
This argument is most compelling in this instance, where the
very

admission of the statement goes not to

a question of

defendant's degree of fault but rather directly and totally defeats
the plaintiff's claim.

To permit this hearsay in this instance is

to sanction a denial of due process and approve manifest injustice
against innocent litigants.
Given the factors which directly question the value of the
statement, it was error for the court to admit the hearsay
statement and the mass of medical record speculation derived
thereunder.

No tests verified a syncopal episode and no doctor

ever diagnosed it. This entire defense, which completely defeated
plaintiff's claim, arose out of a single, self-serving statement by
the defendant made a sufficient time after the collision to invite
the opportunity for fabrication.

Suspiciously, the statement was

made after Woo heard the suggestion of this excuse offered by the
ambulance driver.
The Narciso court, in discussing the theory and purposes
behind the hearsay rule and its numerous exceptions, noted that
most hearsay exceptions have a degree of built in reliability and
that this reliability is heightened by the availability of the
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hearsay witness to testify as to the reliability of the statement.
The court pointed out, however, that:
in the circumstances of this case, glib
reference to the right of cross-examination of
the hearsay witness is hardly a solution nor
does it offer an effective substitute for the
cross-examination of the declarant.
The
cross-examination of a single hearsay witness
as to the circumstances surrounding the
declaration is a far cry from what is
necessary here for a full explanation and
exposition of the truth.
Id. at 291. Again, the analogy is compelling to the facts of the
instant case.
The only possibility the plaintiff had to impeach the fatal
statement was to question Dr. Freedman, a doctor who had never
treated nor examined Woo and could only comment on the records
written by other doctors, years before. Obviously, the ability to
delve into the subtleties, ambiguities and possible alternate
explanations of the Woo statement were absolutely lacking.
For this reason, the admission of evidence deriving from Woo's
self-serving,

exculpatory

reversal

a

for

new

statement was error, and

trial

because

the

evidence

justifies
which

was

"erroneously admitted... 'had a substantial influence in bringing
about the verdict.1" Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989).
Plaintiff/appellant Hansen respectfully requests that this court
grant her request for a reversal and remand so that she might have
a trial untainted by the improper hearsay evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial because:
1.

Erroneously admitted evidence is an adequate grounds upon

which to base a reversal, since the evidence "had a substantial
influence in bringing about the verdict";
2.

The hearsay statement of Defendant Woo was inadmissible

as it did not come within the exceptions provided by either Rule
601 (c) or 803 (4).
For these reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted this j \

day of August, 1992.

SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

Mitchell R. Jensen
Jcjnn Farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
Attorneys for the plaintiff
appellant, Gail 0. Hansen
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that four copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully prepaid,
this

Q I day of August, 1992, to:
Roger Bullock
STRONG & HANNI
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT "C"

Th.rc J.vfi'cra: District

ROGER H. BULLOCK #485
STRONG & HANNI

Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

APR 0 9 1992
(gy-i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GAIL 0. HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

JUDQCENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT

vs.
JOHN HEATH, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of James Woo, deceased,
Defendant.

Civil No. C89-662
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

The above entitled action having come on for jury trial,
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, on March 31 through April 3, 1992,
and plaintiff being present in person and represented by counsel,
John F. Fay, and defendant being present in person and represented
by counsel, Roger H. Bullock and Elizabeth L. Willey, and a jury
having been duly impaneled, and evidenced adduced by both sides,
and the jury having

been instructed

in the law

and having

deliberated and returned its special verdict as follows:

3/103681
1176.868

1.

Was James Woo negligent in the accident of July 15,
1988?
Yes

No

X

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant John Heath, Personal Representative of the Estate of
James Woo, deceased, does have and recover judgment in his favor
and against plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action,
_ 9°

together with taxable costs of court in the amount of $ JTo ~*
DATED this

9 ""ctay of

Cl^/<cJ\

Afb.

.

1992.

BY THE COURT:

V
Kenneth/Rigtrup, p)istj?ict Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this
April, 1992, to:
John F. Fay
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorney for Plaintiff

3/103681
1176.868
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day of

